INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that liquidity risk mismanagement played a key role in the recent global financial crisis. The literature recommends improving liquidity risk management by imposing and monitoring liquidity requirements on systemically important banks and broker dealers (French et al (2010) ), or designing liquidity buffers in order to mitigate systemic risk (Capel (2011); International Monetary Fund (2010b) ; Borio (2009); and Tirole (2008) ).
Although liquidity regulations and tools do exist, they are still in an early stage of development and discussion (International Monetary Fund (2010a) and Tucker (2009) ). Moreover, not all connotations of liquidity are equally addressed by risk literature or regulation. Liquidity has focused on market and funding liquidity, where both correspond to the ability to generate cash from balance sheet liabilities and asset positions, respectively, whereas liquidity risk has traditionally focused on measuring mismatches between them (eg, short-term liabilities and liquid assets).
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As acknowledged by Ball et al (2011) , prior to the recent financial crisis regulators did not focus on intraday liquidity risk and there were no standard monitoring or liquidity management measures in place. Authorities have only begun to focus on intraday liquidity since the crisis. Two main structural shifts may explain the new emphasis on intraday liquidity:
(1) the shift from bank-based to market-based financial systems;
(2) the evolution of payment systems from deferred net settlement systems to liquidity-demanding real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems.
It is important to acknowledge that these structural shifts have not resulted from shocks. They are the result of a continuous and protracted evolution of financial markets. However, because prudential regulation has ignored these structural shifts for decades, the regulatory challenge is substantial: an intraday liquidity risk management framework must be designed.
Among the four typical stages of risk management (ie, identifying, assessing, monitoring and mitigating risk) this paper focuses on the second stage. The approach presented in this paper for assessing the intraday liquidity risk of large-value payment systems (LVPSs) is based on the generation of bivariate Poisson random numbers for simulating the minute-by-minute arrival of received (incoming) and executed (outgoing) payments. In this sense, following Ball et al (2011) , the identified source of intraday liquidity risk modeled here is the timing mismatch between incoming and outgoing payments, which may lead to significant intraday liquidity needs.
This Monte Carlo simulation procedure is capable of modeling the intradaydependency governing the joint arrival of both types of payments, along with their value. Thus, the simulation procedure is able to capture the degree of synchrony (ie, the timing) attained by each financial institution when receiving and executing payments (ie, the virtuous circle of coordinated actions by settlement agents), where such synchrony and the volume of payments varies throughout the day.
The main outcome of the proposed procedure is estimating a risk measure or metric such as an intraday liquidity value-at-risk (VaR) that is able to answer a rather specific question: what are an institution's maximum intraday liquidity needs at a defined confidence level? An answer to this question may be suitable for:
(1) overseeing participants' intraday behavior;
(2) assessing their ability to fulfill intraday payments at a certain confidence level; (3) identifying participants who are nonresilient to changes in timing mismatches of payments;
(4) estimating intraday liquidity buffers.
Regarding the most recent amendments to financial regulation and the increasing importance of liquidity risk as a source of systemic risk, results are useful for financial authorities, institutions and market infrastructures tackling the challenge of managing intraday liquidity risk. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly addresses the increasing relevance of intraday liquidity risk management. Section 3 describes the intuition and procedure behind the proposed approach to simulating the minute-by-minute liquidity (Appendix A contains a comprehensive technical explanation of the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm). Section 4 presents preliminary results and analysis for a set of institutions participating in Colombia's LVPS. Section 5 presents some final comments on the approach, its usefulness and the challenges ahead.
THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF LIQUIDITY AND INTRADAY LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to improve liquidity risk management, including the management of intraday liquidity risk (Ball et al (2011) ). Liquidity is by no means a new concept. It is, however, still an elusive one. It comprises several dissimilar connotations, such as market, funding or intraday liquidity. Although these connotations of liquidity allow for a fairly clear theoretical distinction, in practice they are entangled, particularly under stress scenarios. In this sense, all connotations of liquidity should be equally addressed by prudential regulation. Notwithstanding the importance of properly addressing liquidity risk and its connotations, related regulation is scarce when compared with solvency regulation. The contemporary momentum of liquidity and intraday liquidity regulation has arisen from the recent global financial crisis, which exposed structural shifts in financial markets that have increased the relevance of designing a proper prudential regulatory framework.
Two such structural shifts are commonly acknowledged in the literature. First, the shift from bank-based to market-based financial systems, and second, the shift from deferred net settlement systems to liquidity-demanding RTGS of payments. As explained below, the former has increased the importance of all connotations of liquidity risk, whereas the latter has emphasized the relevance of intraday liquidity risk.
The relevance of liquidity risk in market-based financial systems
The underdevelopment of liquidity regulation is due to the traditional focus on solvency, which is the legacy of banking runs dominating systemic risk origins since the outbreak of the Great Depression. Consequently, liquidity risk has evaded prudential regulation. The best example of the absence of liquidity risk management is the regulatory approach by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. As documented by Goodhart (2008) , the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's original goal was to reverse the downward trend in capital and liquidity for the main international commercial banks. However, for reasons yet to be discovered, this downward trend was reversed for capital, not for liquidity. Thus, according to Eichengreen (2008) , some of the Basel Accord's critics argue that its focus on capital adequacy (ie, lack of liquidity requirements) encouraged regulators to neglect the importance of liquidity in their supervisory activities.
Additionally, not only does the Basel Committee's regulation disregard liquidity risk management, but it is dedicated to banks only, for which it measures mismatches between short-term liabilities (eg, deposits) and liquid assets (eg, loans and investment portfolios). In today's financial markets, with many functions that previously defined banks' traditional domain increasingly being performed by securities markets and nonbank market participants (Kambhu et al (2007) ), 2 focusing on solvency and ignoring liquidity is highly unsafe from a prudential point of view. Therefore, the structural shift from bank-based to market-based systems and the evolution of financial infrastructures, where market and asset liquidity has become as important as the solvency of banks, explains to some extent the increasing relevance of liquidity risk management. Hence, as a consequence of the nature of the global financial crisis, Ackermann (2008) draws two key conclusions. First, in our capital-based financial system, which has developed as a result of disintermediation and credit risk transfer, liquidity is far more important than in a purely bank-based financial system. Second, better liquidity management, rather than higher capital buffers, is likely to provide the right answer. 
The relevance of intraday liquidity risk in RTGS payment systems
A second structural change that has brought about the increasing relevance of liquidity risk is the evolution of financial markets from deferred net settlement systems to liquidity-demanding RTGS of payments. 4 As recognized by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1997), this structural shift was encouraged by banking authorities in an attempt to limit settlement and systemic risk in the interbank settlement process, and to contribute to the reduction of the settlement risk in securities and foreign exchange transactions. However, as pointed out by Bernal (2009) and Bech and Soramäki (2002) , in RTGS systems the reduction in settlement risk is traded off against increased liquidity requirements so that the payment system becomes more reliant on the virtuous circle of coordinated actions by participating settlement agents and, therefore, increased liquidity risk.
5 Following Ball et al (2011) , this means that, whereas RTGS systems financial institutions can reuse liquidity from incoming payments to fund outgoing payments, timing mismatches between incoming and outgoing payments can lead to significant (intraday) liquidity needs.
3 Ackerman (2008) goes further, stating that higher capital requirements may have an adverse effect: if they are too onerous, more activities will be pushed to unregulated parts of the financial system. 4 A deferred net settlement system effects the settlement of obligations or transfers between or among counterparties on a net basis at some later time. An RTGS system consists of the continuous (realtime) settlement of funds or securities transfers individually on an order-by-order basis (without netting); the processing of instructions is carried out on an individual basis at the time they are received rather than at some later time (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003)). Bech (2008) documents that the number of central banks that implemented RGTS systems increased from 3 in 1985 to 93 at the end of 2006.According to World Bank (2011) , from a total of 142 countries surveyed as of December 2010, 116 (83%) have an RTGS system for their LVPSs. 5 Such increasing demand for intraday liquidity is also documented by Bech (2008) , Rochet (2008) and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (1997).
Consequently, as documented by Leinonen and Soramäki (2004) , interest in intraday liquidity results from payment system development and shrinking delivery times. Before the 1990s, operations were strictly on the daily level and intraday liquidity had no significance. As the speed of processing payments has been increased and central banks have converted to RTGS, intraday liquidity has received increasing emphasis.
For instance, the emergence of intraday liquidity risk is rather clear in the evolution of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's approach to liquidity risk. What the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) regarded as the "Principles for the Assessment of Liquidity Management in Banking Organizations" referred to shortterm liquidity management in a day-to-day basis for banks reliant on short-term funding, and in a one-to-three-months-ahead basis for other banks that are not reliant on short-term funding. Intraday liquidity risk was mentioned but was not regarded as being decisive.
More recently, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) explicitly included the management of intraday liquidity risk as a principle on its own (Principle 8), where its purpose is meeting payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions in order to contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems.
6 Furthermore, even more recently, the document entitled Basel III (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)) acknowledges that intraday liquidity needs may not be covered by Basel III's new liquidity coverage ratio, 7 and states that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is reviewing if (and how) intraday liquidity should be addressed.
In the report "Principles for financial market infrastructures" (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012)), Principle 7 is dedicated to liquidity risk management by financial market infrastructures, where the main objective is that such infrastructures maintain sufficient liquid resources to effectuate same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012)). 6 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) document only referred to intraday liquidity four times, with only one mention related to liquidity management (Principle 5). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) document makes about sixty references to intraday liquidity (Principles 3, 5, 9 and 10), and devotes Principle 8 to recognizing its importance within a bank's broader liquidity management strategy and its contribution to systemic risk via the smooth functioning of the payment system. 7 The liquidity coverage ratio is a standard measure that aims to ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a thirty calendar day time horizon under a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario specified by supervisors (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)).
Another example of the increasing focus of regulation on intraday liquidity risk is the UK Financial Services Authority's (FSA's) novel liquidity adequacy regulation (FSA (2012)), which considers intraday liquidity to be a key risk driver in its new liquidity regime. As in the principles of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), the FSA's aim is to ensure that firms are able to meet their payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis in both normal and stressed conditions, emphasizing that this is important for the firm, the firm's counterparties and the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems as a whole. It is worth noting that, unlike the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the FSA's liquidity regulation is not intended for banks only, and refers to "firms", with this term comprising banks, building societies and some types of investment firms. According to JP Morgan (2010), this new regulatory regime includes for the first time all FSA-regulated broker-dealer firms under formal liquidity resource supervision.
In the author's view, concurring with Hervo (2008) , structural developments in the financial industry have led to a clear trend in shortening time horizon of liquidity risk and liquidity management. As Hervo (2008) quotes regarding contemporary financial markets, "my short-term is intraday, my medium-term is overnight and my long-term is one week".
Although payment and settlement systems have received relatively little attention from financial market researchers (Leionen and Soramäki (2004)), intraday liquidity literature has gained momentum, especially with works by Bech (2008) , Leionen (2007) and Koponen and Soramäki (1998) . In the Colombian case, LVPS intraday liquidity has been addressed by Bernal et al (2011 ), Bernal (2009 and Bernal and Merlano (2005) , while some models based on LVPS payments data for payments simulation, connectedness assessment and the identification of systemic importance have been developed recently (Cepeda (2008) ; Machado et al (2009) ; ).
However, the available literature does not address intraday liquidity risk explicitly, and lacks risk measures or metrics (such as an intraday liquidity VaR or expected shortfall) that are able to answer a rather specific question: what are an institution's maximum intraday liquidity needs at a defined confidence level? The next two sections deal with how to address this type of question.
MONTE CARLO INTRADAY LIQUIDITY SIMULATION
Monte Carlo simulation methods are suitable for addressing problems of almost any degree of complexity, and can easily address factors that most other approaches have difficulty with. They become more useful as the complexity and/or dimensionality of the problem increases (Dowd (2005) ). Therefore, as the case in hand comprises several factors to be simultaneously modeled in order to deal with a financial institution's intraday liquidity uncertainty, Monte Carlo provides a compelling approach. The next two subsections contain an explanation of the intuition behind using the Monte Carlo simulation approach to deal with intraday liquidity uncertainty and on the designed procedure, respectively.
Dealing with intraday liquidity uncertainty
According to Principle 8 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), a strategy for achieving intraday liquidity management objectives involves six elements. Elements 1, 2 and 6 are as follows. Financial institutions should have the capacity to monitor intraday liquidity positions against expected activities and available resources.
Financial institutions should be prepared to deal with unexpected disruptions to their intraday liquidity flows.
Additionally, according to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008, Principles 10 and 11), liquidity stress tests and contingency plans should observe the following elements.
Stress tests should consider the implication of the scenarios across different time horizons, including on an intraday basis.
Financial institutions' stress tests should consider how the behavior of counterparties would affect the timing of cash flows, including on an intraday basis.
The size of financial institutions' liquidity cushions should also reflect the potential for intraday liquidity risks.
Likewise, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012) regards intraday liquidity as key for overall liquidity risk management by financial market infrastructures. For instance, these principles encompass the following considerations. 8 The reader should be aware that these principles from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) are limited to banks. Taking into account the importance of the nonbanking institutions in financial markets, the author avoids limiting the application of these principles to banks; the author refers to "financial institutions" instead of banks. Please note that all emphasis is the author's.
A financial market infrastructure should maintain sufficient liquid resources … to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios.
A financial market infrastructure should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.
A common approach suitable for tackling the quantitative demands imposed by these elements is Monte Carlo simulation.All elements, particularly the italicized parts, converge to modeling financial institutions' intraday payments uncertainty (ie, expected liquidity, potential shortfalls, liquidity scenarios, etc), whereas dealing with uncertainty is the whole point of building a Monte Carlo model (Hubbard (2009) ).
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Traditional Monte Carlo methods in finance are aimed at repeatedly simulating the random process governing the returns of an asset or instrument, where the governing process is the geometric Brownian motion, along with some other variations to this customary process.
10 Such typical application of Monte Carlo is rather straightforward and flexible since the random process is easily simulated (ie, there is only one stochastic process for each asset), even when considering the dependence across different assets.
However, simulating intraday liquidity is more intricate. In order to measure expected intraday liquidity inflows and outflows (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008, Principle 8)), two different stochastic processes are to be simulated: one governing the inflows (arrival of received payments), and the other governing the outflows (arrival of executed payments). Because of the type of behavior to be modeled (arrival of payments), geometric Brownian motion is unsuitable, and an arrival-type process has to be used. Each process has to be generated with a Poisson process.
Furthermore, since the degree of synchrony between the arrival of received and executed payments is critical for modeling the virtuous circle of coordinated actions by agents typical of RTGS systems (Bernal (2009) ), the simulation of the random processes has to capture executed and received payments' dependence: each process has to be generated from a bivariate Poisson process. Paraphrasing Ball et al (2011) , this would allow for modeling the timing mismatches between incoming and outgoing payments that lead to an increase in the amount of intraday liquidity required to continue making payments in a timely fashion.
Additionally, the size (ie, monetary value) of the payments has to be modeled along with the frequency of arrival, where the size of payments may not be distributed as a normal variable and where samples may not be large enough to make (parametric) distributional assumptions. Finally, since the behavior of the arrivals, their dependence and their monetary value are not constant throughout the day, the simulation's factors or parameters have to be time-dependent.
Altogether, these considerations demand a Monte Carlo simulation model that is significantly different from its standard implementation in finance. The next subsection addresses the procedure behind an implementation of the Monte Carlo model that is suitable for this paper's purposes. Appendix A contains a comprehensive technical explanation on the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm, with an emphasis on the simulation of bivariate Poisson random variables for the intraday arrival of executed and received payments.
Implementation
The model could be concisely described as the joint and time-dependent simulation of a bivariate Poisson processes for intraday executed and received payments, and their monetary value. The core of the model is the Monte Carlo simulation of bivariate Poisson random variables for the intraday arrival of executed and received payments, while the simulation of their monetary value using bootstrap historical simulation is subordinated to their arrival. The implementation of the model proposed here is done in Matlab. It consists of an algorithm executing the procedure depicted in Figure 1 on the facing page.
The algorithm consists of five main inputs: two databases, for LVPS payments and opening balances, which contain information for all participating financial institutions during one day; and three manual inputs, which select the financial institutions to analyze, define the intraday time frames to use, and the number of simulations to generate.
After reading the inputs, the algorithm selects the first financial institution (eg, bank A) and the first time frame to use (eg, from 07:00 to 08:00). According to this selection, the LVPS orders and opening balances databases are filtered. Afterward, the algorithm classifies both types of payments (ie, executed and received) for the selected institution and time frame.
Afterward (part (a) of Figure 1 on the facing page), the Monte Carlo simulation of the payments' arrival starts by estimating the intensity of the executed and received processes ( E and R ), along with their correlation ( .E;R/ ). After estimating the parameters required for the simulation of the bivariate Poisson process for the intraday 
Intraday timeframes (n = 1,2,...,N) arrival of payments, the algorithm generates the first of the simulations to make for this financial institution, for the selected time frame. Based on the algorithm designed by Yahav and Shmueli (2011) for simulating bivariate Poisson processes, the algorithm yields a minute-by-minute two-dimensional vector where the simulated joint-occurrence of executed and received payments is registered.
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Subsequently, after simulating the first path of arrivals for the selected financial institution and time frame, the algorithm employs the bootstrapped historical simulation method for generating the monetary value of each of the arrivals previously simulated (part (b) of Figure 1 on the preceding page). Thus, each time the algorithm generates the arrival of an executed (received) order, the algorithm employs a uniform random number generator to resample -with replacement -from the historical record of monetary values of executed (received) payments that the selected financial institution made during the selected time frame. This process yields a minute-by-minute two-dimensional vector where the simulated value of executed and received orders is registered.
Next, the monetary value of received and executed payment orders is subtracted. The result is the simulated intraday net payments. If the opening balance is added, the result is the simulated intraday net balance for the selected financial institution and time frame. Both results are the main building blocks of the model: a single simulation of the minute-by-minute liquidity balance (with and without opening balance) for a selected financial institution and time frame. In order to make all the simulations defined by the user, and to cover all financial institutions and time frames, the algorithm performs three loops.
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PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Based on a day of transactions from the February 2012 LVPS database, this section applies the proposed model to simulate the intraday liquidity of two selected financial institutions. 13 The financial institutions selected belong to the top-ten systemically important institutions according to , and they correspond 11 Note that the occurrence of executed or received payments per minute is not limited to a binary outcome (ie, 0 or 1 payments). During a minute several occurrences may take place, with each minute potentially containing several payments. Appendix A contains a comprehensive technical explanation of the Monte Carlo simulation algorithm. 12 This is a technical drawback of the proposed model. In the case of Colombia's LVPS, where more than 100 financial institutions participate directly in the LVPS, with thirteen time frames (ie, hourly, from 07:00 to 20:00), with 1000 simulations, the whole procedure for a single day consists of about 2 million registers. 13 Due to disclosure issues, the opening balance and payments data in this section was multiplied by a factor of 1˙0:1 in order to ensure financial institutions' anonymity without sacrificing congruence and comparability. to a commercial banking firm (henceforth referred to as CBF1) and a broker-dealer firm (BDF1). The selected time frame corresponds to an hour-by-hour 14 breakdown of the Colombian LVPS working hours (ie, 07:00-20:00). The selected number of simulations for all calculations is 1000, but figures display 100 simulations for comprehensibility purposes. Figure 2 displays the observed minute-by-minute intraday payments for selected institutions CBF1 and BDF1. Executed and received payments appear with negative and positive signs, respectively. It is clear that modeling the intraday liquidity as a non-time-varying process would be inconvenient. The intraday liquidity of financial institutions is heavily dependent on the schedule or timeline designed by the administrator of the LVPS and by all other infrastructures that use the LVPS as their settlement system, and on the design of the LVPS, which may be deferred net settlement systems or RTGS, and may also include liquidity saving mechanisms and other types of rules that affect decision-making by the system's participants.
14 An hourly division of the intraday was used in order to attain data-abundant time frames for a representative number of institutions for the whole intraday. Given that highly active institutions along the whole intraday are scarce, using "long" windows reduces the estimation error of the parameters and maximizes the number of institutions to work with. Although the chosen length of time frames is convenient, its soundness is worth examining, as pinpointed by the anonymous referee. Appendix C displays three different assumptions for the length of the windows that divide the intraday time frame (ie, one hour, thirty minutes, fifteen minutes), where there is evidence of a nonnegligible difference between the assumptions, but where it is evident that the cross-section analysis and the conclusions remain. Figure 2 on the preceding page confirms that the pattern of intraday payments is determined in most part by the liquidity saving mechanisms of the Central Bank's Central Securities Depository (CSD) and the LVPS (triangles along the x-axis); the former consists of optimization algorithms running at 11:50, 14:20, 15:30, 16:15, 16:55 and 17:45 , while the latter runs at 16:00.
15 The CSD's optimization algorithms are key to the intraday liquidity of financial institutions since the central government local bond market (ie, the TES market) is the most active and liquid in the Colombian financial system, where CSD TES-related payments account for about 50% of LVPS total payments (Banco de la República (2011)).
It is also clear that, for the selected date, both institutions display a distinctive pattern of intraday liquidity. Beyond any particularity arising from the choice of the date, these results arise from their characteristic business and regulatory framework. For instance, commercial banks have to comply with reserve requirements, whereas broker-dealer firms do not have to. Commercial banks trade bonds and foreign exchange on their own account only, whereas broker-dealer firms trade on their own account and on behalf of clients, profiting from brokerage via commissions; broker-dealer firms are allowed to trade stocks, whereas commercial banks are not.
It is important to stress that such characteristics may explain two distinctive features of the selected financial institutions. First, the intraday liquidity pattern is more concentrated at the end of the day for BDF1. This pattern results from the lack of reserve requirement and the corresponding low level of opening balance, its reliance on the liquidity arriving from the virtuous circle of coordinated actions by other settlement agents, the prominence of liquidity saving mechanisms provided by the CDS for TESrelated transactions.
On the other hand, CBF1, which holds high levels of opening balance (ie, around 2700 times that of BDF1) due to reserve requirements, may execute payments earlier.
16 15 For an introduction to the design and functioning of the Colombian RTGS payment system and its timeline, please refer to Bernal et al (2011) , Banco de la República (2011) and Bernal and Merlano (2005) . 16 As in 52% of the countries using an RTGS system (World Bank (2011)), local participants may use all their reserve requirements balance for intraday settlement purposes. Reserve requirements in Colombia are based on the daily averaging of reserve requirements within a two-week reserve maintenance period. According to Gray (2011) , averaging reserve requirements is an effective way of enhancing liquidity management, but the reserve maintenance period needs to be at least two weeks long. Second, the size of payments is also distinctive, with payments executed and received by the BDF being about 1.8 times those of the CBF. The estimated parameters for the Monte Carlo simulation of bivariate Poisson process for the intraday arrival of payments for both selected financial institutions are displayed in Figure 3 .
17
Based on the estimated parameters, Figure 4 on the next page exhibits 100 extracts from simulating 1000 times the minute-by-minute intraday liquidity of the two selected financial institutions with hourly time frames. 18 This figure corresponds to the simulated intraday net balance; that is, it considers the opening balance of each institution.
19 17 The intensities ( E and R ) were estimated using the standard maximum likelihood estimate for a Poisson distribution, whereas the correlation ( .E;R/ ) was estimated as a standard correlation coefficient; as previously explained, each parameter was estimated for its corresponding time frame. 18 To achieve a fair approximation of the correlation of the simulated bivariate Poisson series to the target correlation is the mainstay of the bivariate Poisson process and the model. As presented in Appendix B, the mean of the correlation of the simulated bivariate Poisson series replicates the target correlation, whereas the simulated correlation of each series disperses around the target correlation as expected. 19 Under certain circumstances it would be useful not to consider the opening balance. For example, to analyze the ability of an institution to face executed payments with received payments (ie, the virtuous circle of liquidity). Other analysis may be available by excluding some intraday funding sources, for example. This would allow for an analysis of the reliance of an institution on Central Bank or on the monetary market's intraday liquidity. In forthcoming papers the author expects to implement such variations to the model. Taking into account the fact that the Colombian LVPS is an RTGS system where no intraday overdraft is allowed, it is interesting to discover that intraday liquidity paths simulated for the CBF1 remain positive for any scenario. Thus, under the model and assumptions proposed here, the CBF would not exhaust its liquidity, and would be able to fulfill its intraday payments without delays or queuing. The rationale behind this finding is the existence of the reserve requirement for commercial banks, which serves as an important source of liquidity for this type of financial institution, as in Bernal et al (2011) .
Meanwhile, because the opening balance of BDF1 is significantly lower than that for CBF1 (about 0.04% of CBF1's), BDF1's simulated paths where its liquidity is exhausted are representative. This also corresponds with findings by Bernal et al (2011) regarding the reliance of nonbanking institutions (ie, with no reserve requirements) on the virtuous circle of intraday liquidity, along with the presence of significantly higher turnover ratios for BDFs when compared with CBFs; for the two selected financial institutions, the turnover ratio (ie, the ratio of payments and opening balance) reached 0.7 and 3181.2 for CBF1 and BDF1, respectively.
Since the simulated minute-by-minute balance of received and executed orders is available, it is possible to estimate a VaR type of measure of intraday liquidity risk. 20 This measure would answer the following question: what are an institution's maximum intraday liquidity needs at a defined confidence level? The answer to this 20 Estimating other risk measures (eg, expected shortfall) is straightforward under the model proposed here. 
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question is displayed in Table 1 on the preceding page for three different intraday scenarios: 21 the maximum intraday liquidity needs within the day, by the end of the day (ie, 17:00), and at a significant moment within the day (here, for example, 15:30). A 99% confidence level and 1000 simulations are used for all calculations.
The first scenario (ie, within the day) corresponds to the "upper bound". Bech and Soramäki (2002) define the upper bound as the amount of liquidity required to settle all payments immediately. Under this bound the liquidity need is maximized, as in an RTGS payment system. This is the most conservative (ie, liquidity demanding) intraday scenario.
The second scenario (ie, by the end of the day) corresponds to the "lower bound". Bech and Soramäki (2002) define the lower bound as the liquidity required by the system if all payments are to be settled collectively at the close of the day, as in a deferred net settlement system. The author's choice of the "by the end of the day" minute for the Colombian case corresponds to the time where the settlement of securities and cash has reached about 95-98% and 85-90%, respectively.
Finally, the choice of 15:30 as a significant moment within the day for the Colombian LVPS corresponds to the middle of both institutions' executed payments most active time frame (ie, 15:00-16:00). During this hour the payments executed by both institutions correspond to 37.5% of their executed payments, the highest of the intraday, where the accumulated executed payments reach 67.8% and 79.8% of each institutions' total, for CBF1 and BDF1, respectively. Furthermore, the 15:30 time is half an hour before the closing of the access to the monetary (Lombard) liquidity window of the Central Bank.
However, as previously mentioned, because the Colombian LVPS relies on an RTGS system where overdrafts are not allowed, all paths below the zero net balance level (ie, negative net balances) are simply unfeasible. Yet simulating those paths allows the resilience of a financial institution facing an unexpected and extreme change in its intraday liquidity patterns to be estimated. The results from the simulation may help to identify nonresilient institutions, since institutions that are heavily reliant on incoming payments may be vulnerable to a liquidity stress should their counterparties decide to delay or stop making payments to it (Ball et al (2011)) .
A financial institution displaying net balance paths significantly below zero could be considered as nonresilient and a potential source of delays and interruptions for the functioning of the LVPS under extreme but plausible circumstances. The overall resilience of such an institution would depend, for instance, on its stock of eligible and unencumbered collateral for accessing central bank liquidity facilities, or for accessing the monetary market.
The previously presented VaR-type measure of intraday liquidity risk is replicated for a wider set of CBFs and BDFs. 22 Based on the same database and assumptions (eg, 99% confidence interval, 1000 simulations, three different intraday scenarios) Table 2 on the next page exhibits the 99% net balance VaR and the percentage of opening balance that would have been used to surmount such scenario for an average CBF and BDF.
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The mean VaR by type of institution confirms the findings for CBF1 and BDF1. The average CBF holds a significant amount of funds at the beginning of the day (about 49.5% of the average executed payments), which allows it to withstand a 99% confidence level adverse setting at any moment within the day. Even at the most severe scenario (ie, the upper bound) the average CBF holds a positive net balance, and requires a fraction of its opening balance (94.1%). As before, such a significant amount of funding at the beginning of the day results from reserve requirements for CBFs.
On the other hand, the average BDF, which is not covered by reserve requirements, holds a significantly lower opening balance at about 0.04% of the opening balance of the average CBF, and equivalent to 0.5% of the average executed payments. Because of this low level of funds at the beginning of the day, the average BDF would be unable to fulfill its intraday payments at a 99% confidence level adverse setting, not even at the less adverse scenario (ie, the lower bound). 24 The resilience of the average BDF would depend mainly on its stock of eligible and unencumbered collateral for accessing central bank's liquidity facilities or for accessing the monetary market.
Results for the selected individual institutions (ie, CBF1 and BDF1) and for an average CBF and BDF concur with results obtained by Bernal and Merlano (2005) , Machado et al (2009) and . For instance, based on the comparison of the upper bound and the available balances of financial institutions, Bernal and Merlano (2005) found that liquidity shortages existed for BDFs, even at the aggregated level, whereas CBFs' required reserve balance held at the central bank was enough to settle the totality of obligations in the payments system. Likewise, based on a mix of network theory and simulation of payments, Machado et al (2009) and found that BDFs are prone to exhausting their liquidity and queuing payments 22 The LVPS database for the selected date comprised nineteen CBFs and twenty-six BDFs, among other types of financial institutions. The institutions included in the set used in this exercise were eleven CBFs and eight BDFs (see Table 2 on the next page); the criterion for inclusion was a threshold of at least ten payments per hour on average within the day. 23 The results of Table 2 on the next page correspond to nonweighted averages. When using weighted averages the intraday liquidity requirements increase for both types of financial institutions, but the analysis remains. 24 A similar conclusion is obtained by Bernal and Merlano (2005) regarding delays due to insufficient intraday funds by BDFs and other nonbanking firms in the Colombian market. when the LVPS network faces an attack (ie, failure to pay by an overly connected selected institution). However, as previously mentioned, the approach presented here improves the measurement of intraday liquidity risk by allowing for estimating standard metrics such as VaR or expected shortfall. This is an important contribution since it provides a known framework (eg, VaR) for designing high degree of confidence stress scenarios such as those suggested by Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions (2012) for financial market infrastructures.
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The results of the model are important for financial authorities.Authorities in charge of prudential regulation, supervision and oversight may use this type of intraday liquidity VaR in order to assess the resilience of financial institutions or financial market infrastructures when confronting intraday liquidity shocks. This information is key for authorities since, as emphasized by Kodres (2009) , failure or insolvency are not the only sources of systemic shocks, but mere failure-to-pay or nonpayment of transactions can gridlock the entire financial system. Furthermore, as acknowledged by Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2005), a higher-than-optimal degree of systemic risk in key payment and settlement systems may result from negative externalities, with RTGS-related negative externalities coming in the form of insufficient incentives to consider the full impact on others of delaying outgoing payments. In this sense, the model's results are an approximation to the impact of changing timing mismatches on an institution's intraday liquidity, its ability to avoid delaying outgoing payments, its share of systemic risk in the LVPS.
Additionally, taking into account recent amendments to financial regulation (eg, from the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the FSA), this model may be a starting point for assessing financial institutions' liquidity and intraday liquidity adequacy. Accordingly, being able to contrast financial institutions' real-time observed intraday liquidity with the model's resulting intraday liquidity uncertainty may be valuable input for an overseer trying to identify abnormal intraday liquidity stances. 25 The principles issued by Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions suggest using a high degree of confidence for determining adequate levels of liquidity for financial infrastructures, where the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation is the suggested metric for such stress scenarios. However, it is difficult to assess the degree of confidence of such an event happening. In this sense, the approach proposed here may provide an intraday liquidity risk metric that works under well-known parameters, such as a VaR with a high degree of confidence.
FINAL REMARKS
As the most recent financial crisis has revealed, nonbanking institutions are as important as banking institutions nowadays, and liquidity is as important as solvency, where financial infrastructures such as the LVPS play a key role for financial stability. This evolution of financial systems, resulting from the shift to market-based financial systems and to RTGS of payments, has been protracted but ignored to some extent, especially by prudential regulation.
As mentioned, prior to the recent financial crisis, regulators did not focus on intraday liquidity risk and there were no standard monitoring or liquidity management measures in place (Ball et al (2011) ). Regulation is working hard in order to catch up with risks arising from increasingly important nonbanking institutions, financial infrastructures and liquidity. Regarding the latter, it is clear that regulators (for example, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and International Organization of Securities Commissions, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the FSA) are updating their regulatory framework in order to enhance liquidity risk management for financial institutions and infrastructures, where intraday liquidity is one of the major concerns and challenges. These efforts parallel the documented trend in shortening time horizons of liquidity risk and liquidity management, with intraday liquidity as the new standard for what is considered to be short term.
The proposed model addresses a key question for intraday liquidity risk management: what are an institution's maximum intraday liquidity needs at a defined confidence level? The chosen approach allows the minute-by-minute liquidity of any financial institution to be modeled, where the main risk factors to be modeled are the arrival of executed and received payments (ie, their intensity), their synchrony (ie, their timing or correlation) and their size (ie, their monetary value). As mentioned, following Ball et al (2011) , the identified source of intraday liquidity risk modeled here is the timing mismatch between incoming and outgoing payments, which may lead to significant intraday liquidity needs.
Besides answering that key question, the model may be suitable for quantitatively supporting analysis regarding four main issues: overseeing participants' intraday behavior; assessing their ability to fulfill intraday payments at a certain confidence level;
identifying participants who are nonresilient to changes in timing mismatches of payments; estimating intraday liquidity buffers.
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These four issues, as demonstrated by the most recent financial crisis, are critical for mitigating liquidity and systemic risk, for financial institutions and financial market infrastructures.
Finally, as previously stated, the model's results are an approximation to the main negative externality arising from a financial institution within an RTGS-based LVPS: an institution's insufficient regard for the potential costs or losses that others would incur in the event of its failure to fulfill its payments in a timely manner. In this sense the model assesses the impact of varying timing mismatches on an institution's intraday liquidity, its ability to avoid delaying outgoing payments and its contribution to systemic risk.
While the advantages of the model are rather apparent, some drawbacks are worth mentioning. First, as with any other model, its outcomes should be analyzed and used with care; they intend to provide a fair explanation of reality based on their assumptions, and they are by no means a substitute for sound judgment, or the sole metric to use to measure intraday liquidity risk. Second, the author considers this model a novel approximation to a long-ignored problem, but recognizes that its usefulness depends on the ability of financial authorities to articulate the measurement of intraday liquidity risk with the other stages of risk management (ie, monitoring and mitigating risk), and to understand the business line of each type of institution. Third, the methodology is demanding in terms of computational resources.
The author also recognizes several challenges ahead. The first is to develop an appropriate backtesting method. The second is to run the model for a long period (eg, a month), which may discard any particularities and biases in the selection of a specific date and would allow for a comprehensive characterization of the intraday patterns of financial institutions. Despite the fact that results concur with other related models and papers that use longer periods, it is a well-known fact that the daily averaging of reserve requirements within the two-week reserve maintenance period results in cyclic patterns of opening balances for credit institutions under local regulation.
The third refers to analyzing the effects of excluding some major liquidity sources from the estimation of the model's parameters. The author's first choice would be to exclude the systemically most important financial institution, or each institution's highest-liquidity-contributing counterparty. This variant would permit the estimation of the change in intraday payment synchrony and uncertainty due to the absence or failure to pay by a relevant counterparty.
The fourth challenge consists of some technical enhancements to the algorithm:
implementing a time-dependent Poisson process, where the progressive onehour-window execution of the algorithm proposed here is replaced by timedependent intensity rates and correlations;
allowing for further intraday liquidity uncertainty from monetary value varying payments, where the bootstrap procedure is replaced by a time-varying parametrical assumption of the size of the payments;
capturing and modeling the dependence between received and executed payments across all participants, and not only the dependence between received and executed payments for a single institution.
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The author expects to address these challenges in forthcoming extensions of this paper, especially those corresponding to the algorithm's technical enhancements.
APPENDIX A. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OF INTRADAY PAYMENTS BASED ON BIVARIATE POISSON PROCESSES AND BOOTSTRAP HISTORICAL SIMULATION
The model could be described as the joint and time-dependent simulation of a bivariate Poisson processes for intraday executed and received payments, and their monetary value. The core of the model is the Monte Carlo simulation of bivariate Poisson random variables for the intraday arrival of executed and received payments, while simulations of their monetary value using bootstrap historical simulation is subordinated to their arrival. Both simulation procedures are addressed below.
A.1 Monte Carlo simulation of bivariate Poisson processes for the intraday arrival of payments
The bivariate Poisson generation is based on the algorithm proposed by Yahav and Shmueli (2011) . 28 Their algorithm is based on the NORTA (NORmal To Anything) procedure for generating multivariate Poisson (labeled "P") data with a target correlation structure (˘P) and arrival rates ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; x ), which is based on simulating data from a multivariate normal (N ) distribution and converting it into an arbitrary continuous distribution with specific correlation matrix. Letting˚.x/ be the normal cumulative distribution function and letting˝.x/ be any target cumulative distribution function, the generalized NORTA procedure is as follows.
(a) Generate a q-dimensional normal vector X N with mean D 0, variance D 1, and a correlation matrix˘N.
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(b) For each value X N , i 2 1; 2; : : : ; q, calculate the normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) (˚.x/):˚.
(c) For each˚.x/, calculate the target cumulative distribution function (˝.x/):
The resulting vector X Y is then a q-dimensional vector, distributed according to the target cumulative distribution function (˝.x/), with correlation˘N.
Despite the simplicity of the NORTA procedure, generating bivariate or multivariate probability distributions when the target distribution is a discrete probability distribution (ie, a random variable can assume only a certain clearly separated values) is more complicated. Such is the case for the Poisson distribution.
The Poisson distribution describes the number of times an event occurs during a specified time, space, area or volume interval. It is a discrete probability distribution since it is formed by counting (Lind et al (2006) ), and is based on two assumptions:
(1) the probability of an event occurring is proportional to the length of the interval;
(2) the probability of an event occurring in an interval is independent of its occurrence in other intervals.
The Poisson distribution is defined by a single parameter ( ) that expresses the probability of a number of events occurring in a fixed interval of time (ie, the mean number of occurrences in a particular interval), where is commonly referred to as the intensity of the process. The Poisson cumulative distribution function ( .x/) corresponds to:
29 Generating normal multivariate random numbers (ie, with correlation matrix˘N) is straightforward by means of the Cholesky decomposition. The interested reader is referred to Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004) and León and Reveiz (2011) .
With sufficiently large , the normal distribution is a fair approximation to the Poisson distribution, where is its mean and variance. Conveniently, as the Poisson distribution converges asymptotically to a normal distribution, attaining multivariate Poisson distributed random variables with correlation˘P is straightforward since the dependence between both distributions would also converge asymptotically (˘N ˘P). However, as pointed out byYahav and Shmueli (2011), when the normal distribution is not a fair approximation to the Poisson distribution (ie, when is small), the convergence in correlation ceases to exist (˘N ¤˘P). The main consequence of such lack of convergence in distribution is that the feasible correlation between two random Poisson variables is no longer in the traditional range [ 1; 1], but in a narrower range [ P > 1; P 6 1].
Furthermore, the smaller the intensity of any of the Poisson processes, the narrower the correlation range, and the more difficult it is to obtain a target correlation. As demonstrated by Shin and Pasupathy (2010) , as any intensity rates 1 and 2 approximate to zero ( 1 ; 2 ! 0), the minimum feasible correlation approximates to zero ( P ! 0). As exhibited in Figure 2 on page 87 and Figure 3 on page 89, this is the case at the beginning and the end of the day, when payments are rather scarce. 30 Therefore, in order to attain bivariate Poisson random variables with intensity rates 1 and 2 , this paper follows the functional approximation developed by Yahav and Shmueli (2011) to estimate the relationship between the desired Poisson correlation ( P ) and the actual (normal) correlation ( N ). The procedure is as follows.
(a) Let U be a vector of uniform randomly distributed variables and compute the correlation mapping [ P > 1; P 6 1], where:
Compute the coefficients of the exponential function estimated by Yahav and Shmueli (2011) : .5) 30 Since the minimum feasible correlation approximates to zero ( P ! 0) when intensity rates approximate to zero ( 1 ; 2 ! 0), the implemented algorithm includes an instruction to round any intensity below 0.0167 (ie, one arrival per hour) to zero, and to simulate the two Poisson processes as noncorrelated ( P D 0). 31 Based on simulations, Yahav and Shmueli (2011) find that the relationship between the desired correlation ( P ) and the actual correlation ( N ) is best approximated by an exponential function
(c) Based on the previously computed coefficients, compute the correlation required to generate bivariate normal random variables ( N ) that approximate the target correlation ( P ): (e) Based on the bivariate normal random variables (X N N.0; N /), follow the NORTA procedure with the Poisson distribution as the target CDF, with intensity rates 1 and 2 .
The resulting vector X P is then a two-dimensional vector, distributed according to the Poisson cumulative distribution function ( .x/), with intensity rates 1 and 2 , and correlation P . For the problem at hand, this procedure yields two vectors:
(1) a minute-by-minute vector of executed payments;
(2) a minute-by-minute vector of received payments, where several executed or received payments per minute may occur; that is, according to the intensity rates there may be more than one arrival per minute.
Both vectors contain the minute-by-minute arrival of payments (their occurrence, not their value), where both vectors approximate the target correlation corresponding to the estimated synchrony between received and executed payments.
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Due to the time-variant characteristics of the LVPS intraday payments, which display time frames with distinctive intensity rates and correlations, the aforementioned procedure is not applied to the whole day; instead, it is applied to one-hour windows, which allows for capturing the intraday seasonality of executed and received payments. 32 In order to attain comparability between simulations, the algorithm is instructed to always obtain the same monetary value of received (respectively, executed) payments as in the observed data. Such a restriction excludes the effect of payments size, and permits focusing on the analysis of changes in payments' synchrony. This does not mean that the same monetary values are used from simulation to simulation, but that the same nonparametrical distribution (ie, the observed payments) was used to generate different monetary values from simulation to simulation. Despite the convenience of the chosen approach to simulating the value of the payments, it may be useful to allow for further intraday liquidity uncertainty arising from value varying payments. This additional source of risk may be modeled by making a time-varying parametrical assumption of the size of the payments.
An alternative to this progressive one-hour-window execution of the algorithm is to design a time-dependent Poisson process, where intensity rates and correlations are functions of time. 33 Despite being a more elegant alternative, two main issues stand against it. First, such a procedure may further complicate the algorithm, which is already burdensome and time-consuming. Second, the design of the time-dependent parameters is by no means trivial, and may further introduce model risk into the approach.
A.2 Bootstrapped historical simulation of received and executed payment value
The previous subsection presented the method for simulating the occurrence or arrival of both received and executed payments, but not their monetary value. The author's choice for simulating the monetary value of payments is based on bootstrapped historical simulation. Based on Dowd (2005) , the author designs a bootstrap procedure (resampling with replacement) 34 to simulate the monetary value of received and executed payments once they occur as a result of the arrival simulation method previously described. Each time a received (respectively, executed) payment arrives the model draws a sample from the received (respectively, executed) historical records, and takes its monetary value as the received (respectively, executed) payment's value for that occurrence.
Compared with other methods available for simulating the monetary value of the payments, the bootstrap avoids unreliable assumptions such as normality of the data set or the existence of large samples (Dowd (2005) ). Regarding the normality of payments, it is clear that they do not converge to a Gaussian distribution ( Figure A .1 on the facing page), while it is also common to find intraday periods characterized by small samples to work with (Figure 2 on page 87 and Figure 3 on page 89).
35 33 The anonymous referee suggested this clever and elegant alternative. Despite being somewhat impractical for the moment (ie, the current algorithm is already time-consuming and computationally demanding), this enhancement is being considered for a newer and more efficient version of the algorithm. 34 The bootstrap procedure consists of sampling from a data set of size n. Each sampling requires the generation of uniform random numbers between 1 and n to randomly draw observations from the data set; drawn observations are returned to the data set (ie, observations are replaced into the data set). Since Monte Carlo may be broadly defined as a method that provides approximate solutions by performing statistical sampling experiments on a computer (Fishman (1995) ) or a random number generator that is useful for forecasting, estimation, and risk analysis (Mun (2006) ), the bootstrap procedure may be considered as involving a Monte Carlo procedure within. Therefore, the author regards the whole method presented here as an implementation of a Monte Carlo simulation. 35 Small samples of payment orders are a significant problem for fairly inactive financial institutions, which tend to make payments infrequently. 
APPENDIX B
Achieving a fair approximation of the correlation of the simulated bivariate Poisson series to the target correlation is the main goal of the bivariate Poisson process and the model. Figure B .1 on the next page demonstrates that the mean of the correlation of the simulated bivariate Poisson series replicates the target correlation, while the simulated correlation of each series disperses around the target correlation.
It is worth mentioning that, since the minimum feasible correlation approximates to zero ( P ! 0) when intensity rates approximate to zero ( 1 ; 2 ! 0), the implemented algorithm includes an instruction to round any intensity below 0.0167 (ie, one arrival per hour) to zero, and to simulate the two Poisson processes as noncorrelated ( P D 0). The author regards this as a safe practice because of the theoretical support behind such an assumption (Yahav and Shmueli (2011) and Shin and Pasupathy (2010) ), and because, during low-intensity periods (eg, 07:00-09:00, 19:00-20:00), the frequency of the payments is nonsignificant relative to the rest of the intervals.
APPENDIX C
In order to assess the soundness of the selected length of the windows that divide the intraday time frame, Table C.1 on the next page displays the VaR for each institution (ie, CBF1 and BDF1) and type of institution (ie, CBFs and BFDs), where the metric corresponds to the 99% confidence VaR as a percentage of total executed payments.
It is rather apparent that the cross-section analysis is the same for any of the three assumptions considered, with the sole exception of the 15:30 scenario when comparing CBF1 and BDF1. However, since the monetary value of the payments made by BDF1 is significantly higher than the value of the payments made by CBF1 (ie, 1.8 times), and the opening balance is significantly higher for CBF1 (ie, 2700 times the BDF1s), the analysis and conclusions of the paper are valid regardless of the chosen assumption. Nevertheless, any implementation and analysis resulting from the proposed approach should be aware of the trade-off between a more precise characterization of the intraday process by a more granular breakdown of the time frame, and the availability of abundant observed arrivals to estimate the parameters of the simulation for a meaningful and diverse sample of institutions.
